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INTRODUCTION 
Capitalization is an indispensable step in the creation of 
any business enterprise.  Start-up ventures are especially 
challenging to finance, where investors balance the high 
potential yield on their capital contributions against the 
overwhelming probability those investments will never mature 
into the Powerball-esque1 windfalls from Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs).2  The cunning venture capitalist (which most 
are), bears in mind the risk of bankruptcy in order to protect 
at least some piece of their investment should the enterprise 
fail (which most do).3  The present bankruptcy system, 
however, contains a multitude of unpredictable risks making 
this task exceedingly difficult.  Among these risks is the power 
of federal bankruptcy courts to equitably subordinate loans, 
transforming the creditor interest in those loans from debt to 
equity.  Under the absolute priority rule, an equity interest has 
only a residual priority to the assets of a corporation, whereas 
debt interest has first priority.4 
Equitable subordination was long considered the 
bankruptcy court’s exclusive tool to alter the nature of debt 
(and thus priority of a creditor to collect in bankruptcy under 
the absolute priority rule).  However, another means for courts 
to transmute debt has quietly arisen.  Bankruptcy courts have 
 
 1.  Powerball is a popular multi-state shared jackpot lottery in the United 
States.  At the time of this writing, odds of winning the grand prize stand at 1 : 
175,223,510.  See POWERBALL POWERPLAY, http://www.powerball.com/powerbal 
l/pb_howtoplay.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 2.   Only one percent of startups will reach an independent IPO. While 
seventy percent will fail.  See Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out 
of 4 Start-Ups Fail, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476
429190. 
 3.  See Gage, supra note 2. 
 4. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B); see also In re DBSD North America, Inc., 
634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (where a bankruptcy judge invalidated a 
reorganization plan under which debtor’s shareholders received a portion of their 
claims without prior consent of unsecured creditors who had priority to those 
assets); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991). 
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“recharacterized” debt, reclassifying loans as equity in 
bankruptcy regardless of any inequitable conduct on behalf of 
that creditor to whom the sum is owed.  This power of debt 
recharacterization is not without debate.  Several courts have 
found this power as impliedly reserved to federal law, while 
others see recharacterization as dependent solely on state law.  
A third contingent finds no basis whatsoever for debt to be 
recharacterized.  These distinct views are troubling because 
they sow unpredictability into business decisions where 
stability is precious.  The inability to foresee, at least to some 
degree, the disposition of debt financing efforts may chill the 
investment environment as investors hesitate to provide 
bridge loans or other forms of enterprise-saving debt financing. 
This Comment will begin by providing background of both 
debt recharacterization and equitable subordination.  Key 
features of bankruptcy in the United States will be examined, 
including 1) the equitable and statutory bases through which 
bankruptcy courts operate,5 2) the congressionally mandated 
uniformity for which these courts strive,6 and 3) the role of 
state law in bankruptcy proceedings.7  Following this 
background, an explanation of key doctrinal issues associated 
with the current state of debt recharacterization will be 
explained,8 including an analysis of the practical challenges 
the legal community currently faces.9  Lastly, this comment 
will propose that debt recharacterization be codified within the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) as an express grant of power to 
bankruptcy courts so as to remain viable for use in bankruptcy 
proceedings.10  Codification within the Code will provide a 
uniform nationwide standard and serve as a stable foundation 
upon which corporate attorneys can structure financings.  The 
result is a more coherent body of insolvency law that helps, not 
hinders, the market for business investment. 
 
 
I. THE SOURCES OF BANKRUPTCY COURT POWER AND 
DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND 
 
 5. See infra Part I(A)(1),  I(A)(2). 
 6. See infra Part I(A)(4). 
 7. See infra Part I(A)(5). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part III(E). 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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DEBT RECHARACTERIZATION 
The debt recharacterization issue is best conceptualized 
through an understanding of two central themes.  First, the 
nature and function of the bankruptcy court system itself is 
vital to the analysis.  The equitable and statutory functions 
that bind bankruptcy courts, as well as the role of state law in 
bankruptcy proceedings, frame an analysis of whether the 
current debt recharacterization doctrine furthers the base 
purpose of the United States bankruptcy system. 
Second, in addition to an understanding of the bankruptcy 
regime, it is important to understand the key differences 
between equitable subordination and debt recharacterization.  
This distinction is of obvious importance in considering 
whether the two doctrines serve as legitimate solutions to 
independent problems, or impose clumsy superfluities on an 
already overwhelmed judiciary. 
A. Sources of Bankruptcy Court Power 
The United States Bankruptcy Code serves as the 
foundation upon which bankruptcy courts exercise their power.  
However, bankruptcy courts have long been considered to 
wield additional legal authority beyond that expressly written 
into the Code.  These additional exercises of power above and 
beyond that granted by the Code can be classified as stemming 
from an inherent power of the courts, from federal common 
law, or as equitable power. 
1. Inherent Powers 
The inherent powers of the federal district courts arise 
from Article III of the United States Constitution.11  However, 
because bankruptcy court are established pursuant to Article 
I, they maintain no such constitutional authority.12  Though 
some courts have interpreted Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) 
 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. III (“The judicial power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 12. See In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy 
courts “derive their authority solely from Congress, while district courts are 
accorded their inherent powers in Article III”); In re Hessinger & Assocs., 192 
B.R. 211, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Because the bankruptcy courts are creatures of 
Article I, they have no ‘inherent’ powers and their jurisdiction is limited to that 
expressly granted by Congress.”). 
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as granting inherent power to bankruptcy judges,13 debate 
remains over whether this constitutes a true inherent power or 
simply the exercise of broadly construed statutory authority.14 
Notwithstanding Section 105(a), courts have consistently 
held that bankruptcy courts have inherent powers in a variety 
of other situations.  Bankruptcy judges have the power to 
sanction parties,15 enforce settlements,16 issue injunctions,17 
direct disbursements of registry funds,18 set aside illegal 
assignments,19 reconsider interlocutory orders,20 punish 
abuses of process,21 correct mistakes and errors,22 dismiss 
cases,23 hold parties in contempt,24 suspend or disbar 
 
 13. In re Collins, 250 B.R. 645, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Caldwell v. Unified 
Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 
1996) (observing that inherent power to sanction vexatious conduct is recognized 
in section 105(a)); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 
1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that section 105 is intended to imbue the 
bankruptcy courts with the inherent power recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.); In re Marvel, 265 B.R. at 609 (noting that a 
bankruptcy court’s inherent power to sanction conduct recognized by section 
105(a)). 
 14. See, e.g., Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) 
(“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can 
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”); but see In re GSF 
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting a broad grant of equitable 
power under § 105(a)); See generally 2-105 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], p. 
105–06 (16th ed. 2010). 
 15. See Pearson v. First NH Mortgage Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir. 
1999); McGahren v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.3d 1159, 1172 (4th 
Cir. 1997). 
 16. See City Equities Anaheim, Ltd. v. Lincoln Plaza Dev. Co. (In re City 
Equities Anaheim, Ltd.), 22 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 17. See S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I. 
Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987) DOC 19; A.H. Robins 
Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1003 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 18. See United States v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc.), 18 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 19. See Dalton Dev. Project v. Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Unioil), 948 
F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 20. See Roumeliotis v. Popa (In re Popa), 214 B.R. 416, 420 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
1997). 
 21. See McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 217 B.R. 598, 608 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1998). 
 22. See Canino v. Bleau (In re Canino), 185 B.R. 584, 592 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1995). 
 23. See Marino v. Classic Auto Refinishing, Inc. (In re Marino), 213 B.R. 846, 
851 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); Tenorio v. Osinga (In re Osinga), 91 B.R. 893, 894 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988). 
 24. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R. 637, 642 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1998). 
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attorneys,25 review actions of state courts and enjoin further 
proceedings,26 and control the court’s dockets.27 
2. Federal Common Law 
Federal common law is another avenue through which 
federal courts have been able to exert judicial power outside 
the scope of statutory schemes.  Since bankruptcy judges are 
considered judicial officers of their respective district courts,28 
it would seem appropriate that bankruptcy courts share the 
ability of U.S. District Courts to contribute to federal common 
law where such a tradition has been established.  Generally, 
federal common law is appropriate where it is either 1) 
necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, or 2) where 
Congress has specifically given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law.29  The general precondition for the formation 
of federal common law is a showing that there is “significant 
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of 
state law.”30  The instances where the United States Supreme 
Court has deemed a federal common law appropriate are “few 
and restricted.”31  Specifically, the Court has noted that: 
Absent some congressional authorization to formulate 
substantive rules of decision, federal common law only 
exists in such narrow areas as those concerned with the 
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and 
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of 
States or our relation with foreign nations or admiralty 
cases.32 
Thus far, there is a finite list of federal common law 
application in bankruptcy cases.  This exhaustive list includes 
the governance of privileges,33 the requirement that 
 
 25. See Peugeot v. United States Trustee (In re Crayton), 192 B.R. 970, 976 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996). 
 26. See Watson v. Shandell (In re Watson), 192 B.R. 739, 746 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1996); Fernandez-Lopez v. Fernandez-Lopez (In re Fernandez-Lopez), 37 B.R. 
664, 669 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984). 
 27. See In re Moog, 774 F. 2d 1073, 1076 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 151, 152(a)(1) (2000). 
 29. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
 30. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. 
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
 31. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). 
 32. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). 
 33. See Foster v. Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 
1999) (“Federal common law governs control of a debtor’s privilege.”); Am. 
Metrocomm Corp. v. Morris (In re Am. Metrocomm Corp.), 274 B.R. 641, 653 
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permission be obtained before suing a trustee in bankruptcy,34 
whether a constructive trust arises under Bankruptcy Code 
Section 541(d),35 and choice of law.36  Federal common law has 
also been applied in bankruptcy cases regarding federal 
government “setoff rights”37 to pension plans under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),38 and in 
recognizing liens under ERISA.39 
The Supreme Court has expressly refused to allow the 
formulation of federal common law “to supplement a federal 
statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed,”40 
stating that “matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are 
presumably left subject to disposition provided by state law.”41  
The Bankruptcy Code is precisely this sort of comprehensive 
federal statutory system,42 and therefore matters left 
unaddressed in the Code seem subject to state law rather than 
substantive judicial lawmaking.43 
3. Equitable Power 
While bankruptcy courts are virtually unanimously 
considered courts of equity,44 this concept is somewhat of a 
misnomer.45  All courts derive their equitable powers “from . . . 
 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that, except where 
state law provides the governing rule in civil proceedings, control of a debtor’s 
privileges is governed by federal common law.”). 
 34. See Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 35. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In 
re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc.), 997 F.2d 1039, 1055–62 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 36. See Bianco v. Erkins (In re Gaston & Snow), 243 F.3d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“[F]ederal choice of law rules are a type of federal common law”). 
 37. United States v. Fleet Bank of Mass. (In re Calore Express Co.), 288 F.3d 
22, 43 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 38. Senior Executive Benefit Plan v. New Valley Corp. (In re New Valley 
Corp.), 89 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 39. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 252 B.R. 905, 910 
(E.D. Va. 2000). 
 40. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162, 168 (N.D. Ill. 
1990). 
 43. Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 633, 639 (2004) (“[F]ederal courts may not create federal common law and 
must find and follow state law when confronted with a legal issue that is beyond 
the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause [of the Constitution.]”). 
 44. See e.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); United States v. 
Energy Res. Co., Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 549–50 (1990); Nw. Bank Worthington, v. 
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 
(1945); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942). 
 45. Courts of equity developed in England as an alternative to the common 
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the provisions of statutes or constitutions.”46  Therefore, it 
follows that federal courts enjoy equitable powers to the extent 
that such ability is conferred by the Constitution.47  As 
mentioned previously, bankruptcy courts were created under 
Article I, not Article III, and thus are not vested with the same 
equitable authority the federal district courts enjoy.48  
Consequently, the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts are 
derived from the Code.49 
Under the present iteration of the Code, a court does not 
have any general equitable authority. Nonetheless, some 
courts have construed Bankruptcy Code section 105(a) to grant 
equitable power.50  That section authorizes a bankruptcy judge 
to “issue any order, process, or judgment necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Code.51  
Additionally, Congress has incorporated specific equitable 
principles into the Code itself.  For example, a bankruptcy 
judge may issue an automatic injunction—an equitable 
 
law courts.  Administered by a Chancellor as opposed to a common law judge, 
these courts issued bills in equity intended to alleviate injustices that would 
result from the rigid application of common law.  See, e.g., Stephen N. 
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914–21 (1987). 
 46. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 530, 
554 (4th ed. 1918); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE 64 (2d ed. 1839) (“The Constitution of the United States has, in 
one clause, conferred on the National Judiciary cognizance of cases in equity”). 
 47. See also McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887) (“[Equity 
jurisdiction] is vested, as a part of the judicial power of the United States, in its 
courts by the constitution and the acts of congress in execution thereof.”); Noonan 
v. Lee, 67 U.S. 499, 509 (1862) (“The equity jurisdiction of the Courts of the 
United States is derived from the Constitution and Laws of the United States.”). 
 48. See Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s 
Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 378 
(2001) (“Article I courts have no general equitable powers or generalized ability 
to grant equitable relief purely from their existence as courts of law.  However, to 
the extent that Congress affords to an Article I court jurisdiction over equitable 
causes of action or jurisdiction to grant equitable relief, the court has those 
powers unless the grant unconstitutionally infringes on Article III courts.”). 
 49. See Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What 
Does that Mean?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 275, 292 (1999) (“Bankruptcy remedies 
and insolvency rights have always been a product of legislative enactment rather 
than case-by-case determination in common law or equity courts.”); Lederman, 
supra note 48, at 376 (“In general, any equitable power an Article I court exercises 
finds its source in a statute.”). 
 50. See Brenham v. Deerfield Org., Inc. (In re Norman Indus., Inc.), 1 B.R. 
162, 165 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1979) (stating that the predecessor of § 105(a) 
recognized and declared the principle that courts of bankruptcy are courts of 
equity). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000). 
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remedy.52  Perhaps most pertinent to the present issue, Section 
510 permits a bankruptcy court to equitably subordinate 
creditor claims.53 
Therefore, bankruptcy courts do not enjoy unbounded 
powers of equity; specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
explicitly indicate when a court should evaluate the equitable 
side of a legal issue. 
4. The Uniformity Requirement 
The Constitution empowers Congress to make “uniform 
Laws . . . on the subject of Bankruptcies.”54  This concept is 
problematic in bankruptcies because state laws govern 
relationships between debtors and creditors.  This means that 
a creditor in one state may likely face a different result than 
they would in another.  At a glance, this discrepancy would 
seem to compromise the uniformity demanded by the 
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.  The Court, however, 
has ruled to the contrary.55  In the landmark decision of 
Hanover Int’l Bank v. Moyses,56 the Court held that that the 
Constitution only required “geographic uniformity.”57  The 
Court upheld the incorporation of state transaction laws into 
the Bankruptcy Code, and observed that geographic 
uniformity was satisfied when “the trustee takes in each state 
whatever would have been available to the creditor if the 
bankrupt law had not been passed.”58 
A bankruptcy law is uniform then, when i) the state 
substantive law applied in bankruptcy would also apply 
outside of bankruptcy, ii) creditors and debtors are all subject 
to the same law, and iii) Congress has delegated the power to 
states to fix such laws.59  Thus, creditors in differing states may 
receive disparate treatment without rendering a state law 
unconstitutional for violating the uniformity clause.  Most 
 
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). 
 53. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 510. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 55. See Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A 
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22 
(1983). 
 56. Hanover Nat’l Bank of the City of New York v. Max Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 
(1902). 
 57. Id. at 188. 
 58. Id. at 190. 
 59. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 47 (1995). 
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recently, lower courts have upheld Moyses when state specific 
exemption provisions were challenged.60  While the Supreme 
Court has not considered these specific exemption provisions, 
it has continued to reaffirm that “the uniformity requirement 
is not a straightjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish 
among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from 
recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial 
transactions in a uniform manner.”61  Thus, the possibility 
remains that Congress may add specific provisions to the 
Bankruptcy Code to ensure uniformity nationwide. 
Literal uniformity may not be available under modern 
bankruptcy jurisprudence since state laws may differ with 
respect to their treatment of the creditor-debtor relationship.62  
Nonetheless, the underlying intent behind the Uniformity 
Clause to provide as equal results as possible between 
bankruptcy courts across the nation should still be recognized 
as an underlying aspiration for bankruptcy proceedings. 
5. State Law in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Despite the constitutionally mandated uniformity 
bankruptcy courts strive to create among the nationwide class 
of creditors, several elements of bankruptcy proceedings 
remain firmly rooted in the law of individual states.  
Identifying these bastions of state law in federal bankruptcy 
proceedings is relevant to a debt recharacterization discussion 
because a number of courts have found debt recharacterization 
to be a claim rooted in state law.  Further, some have advocated 
for debt recharachterization as state law remedy separate from 
federal bankruptcy law.63  Whether these approaches are 
viable depends on state law application to bankruptcy, and 
whether debt recharacterization fits within these areas. 
Property rights are the primary area through which state 
law enters bankruptcy proceedings.  Even in the days of Swift 
v. Tyson,64 where the Court recognized a general federal 
common law, state law was relied on to define property 
 
 60. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.). 
 61. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982). 
 62. See generally Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform 
Laws”, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt 
Recharacterization under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257 (2007). 
 64. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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rights.65  The Supreme Court has consistently held that federal 
statutes “create no property rights but merely attach 
consequences . . . to rights created under state law.”66  Most 
commonly, state laws regarding business transactions (such as 
state variations of the Uniform Commercial Code) govern the 
nature of state transactions and the rights that result from 
these transactions when they are evaluated later under the 
Bankruptcy Code.67 
State law causes of action are another area where 
bankruptcy law may be supplemented by state law.  For 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court recently precluded a 
cause of action against the directors of a company after that 
company was declared insolvent in bankruptcy.68  The 
Delaware corporate shield statute was applied, resulting in the 
dismissal of the bankruptcy trustee’s action against the 
directors under the Delaware statute.69 
B. Debt Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination 
1. Equitable Subordination 
The principles that drive equitable subordination stem 
from a policy to deter fraud and breach of fiduciary duties by 
controlling shareholders of bankrupt entities.70  Two Supreme 
Court cases established the primary guidelines bankruptcy 
courts follow when equitably subordinating creditor claims 
that were later codified into the Bankruptcy Code itself.  In 
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co.,71 the Court 
considered the claim of a parent corporation whose subsidiary 
 
 65. See generally Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas 
Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[P]roperty rights have 
traditionally been, and to a large degree are still, defined in substantial part by 
state law.”); United States v. MidPac Lumber Co., Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 
(D. Haw. 1997) (“In determining whether such property or rights to property 
exists, federal and state courts must look to state law.” (citing Aquilino v. United 
States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960))). 
 66. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress has 
generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s 
estate to state law.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); Vanston 
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). 
 68. See Prod. Res v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 787–95 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Jeremy W. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of 
Lender Liability: Toward A New Model of “Control,” 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 805 
(1987). 
 71. Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. et al., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). 
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was in bankruptcy.  The stock of the debtor company, Deep 
Rock Oil Corp., was owned almost entirely by Standard Gas 
and Electric.72  Standard was also Deep Rock Oil’s creditor.73  
In the proceedings, preferred shareholders of Deep Rock Oil 
challenged Standard’s claim, seeking subordination of that 
claim in relation to those of the preferred shareholders.74  The 
Court found that not only was Deep Rock undercapitalized, but 
that through mismanagement, Standard improperly caused 
Deep Rock to enter into a series of transactions that benefitted 
Standard and harmed Deep Rock.75  Additionally, Standard 
caused Deep Rock to continually pay improper dividends to the 
preferred stockholders, which prevented their ability to take a 
management role in the company.76  The Court refused to 
subordinate Standard Gas and Electric’s claim simply because 
it exercised control over Deep Rock.77  However, the Court did 
order that in whatever form Deep Rock was reorganized into 
following the bankruptcy, the preferred stockholders were to 
have an equity interest superior to Standard’s.78 
The following term, the Court considered Pepper v. 
Litton.79  The importance of Pepper lies in the Court’s holding 
that subordination of a corporate director’s claim (in this case, 
for salary deficiencies) is appropriate where that director 
breaches his fiduciary duty.80  The Court reasoned that 
directors’ dealings with a corporation are subject to rigorous 
scrutiny.81  Thus, when agreements made between directors 
and the corporations are challenged, the burden lies with the 
director to show good faith and fairness of the transaction.82  
Pepper lays the foundational principles for equitable 
subordination.  Viewing Taylor and Pepper together, courts 
need not find fraudulent activity to subordinate claims.83  
Control by a shareholder and undercapitalization of the 
corporation are likewise not essential prerequisites (though 
 
 72. Id. at 310. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 320. 
 76. Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co. et al., 306 U.S. 323 (1939). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 324. 
 79. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
 80. Id. at 311–12. 
 81. Id. at 306. 
 82. Id. at 307. 
 83. Id. at 312. 
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they constitute grounds in themselves for equitable 
subordination).84  It is sufficient that a fiduciary breach the 
duty of loyalty by acting for its own benefit and to the 
detriment of the corporation in bankruptcy.85  If such an 
occurrence is present, a court may invoke its power to 
subordinate the claims of the party at fault “to the end that 
fraud will not prevail.”86 
The above cases provided the foundational principles upon 
which Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code was eventually 
based.  Section 510(c)(1) provides bankruptcy courts with the 
express authority to subordinate claims in relation to those of 
others.87  The provisions’ legislative histories clearly indicate 
that Congress “intended the term ‘principles of equitable 
subordination’ follow existing case law and leave to the court 
the development of this principle.”88  By specifically 
incorporating equitable subordination into the Code, Congress 
rejected any per se subordination of insider debt.89 
2. Debt Recharacterization 
Similar to equitable subordination, debt 
recharacterization supplies a means by which bankruptcy 
courts will consider debt as equity for purposes of creditor 
priority during bankruptcy.90  As with equitable subordination, 
when a creditor has debt recharacterized from debt to equity, 
they fall behind other creditors who would then have superior 
claims of control over the assets of a corporation during 
liquidation or reorganization based on the absolute priority 
rule.91  The factors through which a court will decide to 
recharacterize debt remain in flux.  Currently, no less than 
three separate lines of federal case law address debt 
 
 84. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308–10 (1939). 
 85. Id. at 310–11. 
 86. Id. at 305. 
 87. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000). 
 88. 124 Cong. Rec. 32398 (1978). 
 89. Congress rejected the idea of blanket subordination of all insider claims; 
in the report accompanying the final bill, Congress endorsed existing case law 
and affirmed the equitable power of the bankruptcy courts to subordinate claims 
in circumstances consistent with current case law.  H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 359 
(1978). 
 90. See generally Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity 
Recharacterization Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, 22-
NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2004). 
 91. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991). 
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recharacterization, in addition to state doctrines on the issue. 
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted an objective test with 
respect to debt recharacterization.  This two-pronged test was 
first established in Estes v. N & D. Properties, Inc.92  The court 
stated that “shareholder loans may be deemed capital 
contributions in two circumstances: where the trustee proves 
initial undercapitalization or where the trustee proves that the 
loans were made when no other disinterested lender would 
have extended credit.”93  This test is articulated for the first 
time in Estes, as no prior precedent is cited.94 
The court also asserts that a stockholder and lender share 
fiduciary obligations to one another without reference to state 
law (which, as stated above, would normally govern such a 
relationship).95  Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Estes 
that a shareholder loan to a corporation should be deemed per 
se invalid if a disinterested third party would not have 
extended such a loan.96  The Eleventh Circuit approach has not 
enjoyed acceptance in any of the other courts. 
In sharp contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the 
Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have advanced multi-
factored tests for debt recharacterization more flexible than 
that posed by the Eleventh Circuit.97  While each test differs 
semantically, the substantive basis behind each remains the 
same.98  The most commonly cited of such tests is from Roth 
Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,99 where 
eleven factors were considered.100  The court stated that not all 
 
 92. Estes v. N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 93. Id. at 733. 
 94. See generally id. 
 95. Id. at 731–32. 
 96. Id. at 733. 
 97. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 
F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors, 453 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2006); Bayer Corp. v. 
MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 747–53 (6th Cir. 2001); Sender v. The Bronze 
Group, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 98. In re Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North 
America) Inc. v. The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (The Plan Monitoring 
Comm.), 453 F.3d 225, 234 n.6 (“The substance of all of these multifactor tests is 
identical.”). 
 99. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 800 F.2d 625 (6th 
Cir. 1986). 
 100. Id. at 630.  Factors considered were “(1) the names given to the 
instruments, if any, evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a 
fixed maturity date and schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a 
fixed rate of interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the 
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factors needed to be applied to every case,101 that the weight 
given to each factor may vary, and that no single factor was 
controlling.102  Specifically, status as an insider creditor and 
undercapitalization by themselves do not warrant debt 
recharacterization.103  To distinguish debt recharacterization 
from equitable subordination, courts following this approach 
have reasoned that debt recharacterization is a method of 
determining intent rather than assigning fault.104  Creditor 
conduct is still relevant though, when it is pertinent to 
determining intent of the transaction at issue.105 
Debt tends to remain enforceable when the Roth Steel 
factors are applied as long as an inside creditor dealt with the 
bankrupt entity in the same manner as an outsider.106  At the 
same time, insiders are also generally considered fiduciaries, 
so transactions that harm other creditors encounter increased 
scrutiny.107  The factor that most commonly results in debt 
being recharacterized is where the loan is unconventional or 
poorly documented.108  Since no single factor is determinative 
however, even the most poorly documented loans do not 
warrant automatic recharacterization.109  In a practical sense, 
the Roth Steel factors are rarely used to recharacterize debt as 
equity, out of concerns that such judicial activism would 
“discourage legitimate efforts to keep a flagging business 
afloat.”110  Insider loans are the sole type of situation where 
courts have been willing to even consider recharacterization, 
and even in a large number of such decisions, 
 
adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between the 
creditor and the stockholder; (7) the security, if any, for the advances; (8) the 
corporation’s ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the 
extent to which the advances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; 
(10) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and 
(11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayments.” 
 101. See In re SubMicron Sys. v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP, 432 F.3d 448, 455 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 102. See id. at 456; Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234. 
 103. See Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234. 
 104. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 456; Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 232. 
 105. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 456. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Cent. Coops., Inc. v. Irwin (In re Colonial Poultry Farms), 177 B.R. 
291, 300 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).  
 108. See Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 236. 
 109. See SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 458; In re Internet Navigator, Inc., 289 
B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 110. In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 n.1.(10th Cir. 2004). DOC 
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recharacterization was ultimately rejected.111 
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast to both the Eleventh Circuit 
approach and the multi-factor analysis shared by the four 
circuits above, has traditionally held that bankruptcy courts 
completely lack authority to recharacterize loans.112  The Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held in Creditors’ Comms. 
of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., Inc. 
that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow recharacterization of 
debt as capital contributions.113  The court noted that since 
Bankruptcy Code section 510(c) already governed equitable 
claim subordination, the ability of courts to recharacterize debt 
by different means was impermissible.114  Despite the 
reasoning of Pacific Express, the Ninth Circuit, in a recent 
decision appears to have adopted the reasoning of the four-
circuit coalition and its multi-factor test.115  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit serves as a perfect demonstration of the present 
uncertainty of debt recharacterization as applied by the courts. 
In addition to the rules promulgated by the Eleventh, 
Ninth, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, state law has 
also been utilized as a basis for debt recharacterization 
completely independent of federal law.116  Decisions in 
Massachusetts and Wisconsin serve as an illustration. 
Massachusetts courts have identified two primary factors 
applied when considering whether to recharacterize debt. 
Initial undercapitalization of a business organization serves as 
the first basis.117  In Albert Richards, Co. v. The Mayfair Inc., 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recharacterized 
debt as equity based on that corporation’s nominal 
 
 111. See e.g., SubMicron Sys., 432 F.3d at 458; Viera v. AGM II, LLC (In 
re Worldwide Wholesale Lumber, Inc.), 372 B.R 796, 811–12 (Bankr. D. S.C. May 
21, 2007); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561–62 
(D. R.I. 1993); Congress Fin Corp. v. Airwalk Int’l, LLC (In re Airwalk Int’l, LLC), 
305 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003). 
 112. See Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Commercial Funding Corp., Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). 
 113. Id. at 115. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 116. See, e.g., Obre v. Alban Tractor Co., 179 A.2d 861 (Md. 1962); Albert 
Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934); Yankee Microwave, Inc. 
v. Petricca Commc’n Sys., Inc., 760 N.E.2d 739, 759 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Schaub 
v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Anderson Excavating & 
Wrecking Co. v. Argus Dev. Co., 2002 WL 31747248, at *12 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 
10, 2002); Lascsak v. Hollingsworth,  2006 WL 786455, at *6–7 (Neb. Ct. App. 
Mar. 28, 2006); Waller v. Am. Int’l Distrib. Corp., 706 A.2d 460, 464 (Vt. 1997). 
 117. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934). 
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capitalization.118  This decision was later cited by the Supreme 
Court in Pepper v. Litton119 (which was the case establishing 
equitable subordination, not recharacterization).120  The Albert 
Richards decision also seemed to perform what would later 
become an equitable subordination analysis.121  The court 
expressly stated that under Massachusetts’s law, “the right 
and the duty of courts to look beyond the corporate forms are 
exercised only for the defeat of fraud or wrong, or the remedy 
of injustice.”122 
The second factor considered by Massachusetts state 
courts, inequitable conduct, further blurs the line between debt 
recharacterization under state law and equitable 
subordination under the Code.  In SFB Corp v. Cambridge 
Automatic, Inc.,123 the Massachusetts Superior Court 
considered enforcement of a promissory note owned by the 
President and CEO of a company.124  The court refused to apply 
the Roth Steel factors125 when considering the request to 
recharacterize the loan.126  Instead, Massachusetts’s law was 
applied, where the loan survived recharacterization.127 
Wisconsin is the second state to have formulated an 
independent state basis for debt recharacterization.  In the 
leading decision on the issue, In re Mader’s Store for Men, 
Inc.,128 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly rejected 
federal bankruptcy court precedent.129  The court identified 
three factors that almost always result in a debt being 
recharacterized as a capital contribution.130  Firstly, loans 
made to the corporation by individuals who can exert some 
degree of substantial control over the company form a basis for 
that debt to be recharacterized.131  Secondly, under an objective 
viewpoint, the circumstances must indicate that the loan was 
 
 118. Id. at 434–35. 
 119. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 309–10 (1939). 
 120. See supra Part I(B)(1). 
 121. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934). 
 122. Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1937). 
 123. 2002 WL 31481078 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2002). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See infra note 93. 
 126. See SFB Corp., 2002 WL 31481078. 
 127. Id. at 1. 
 128. Gelatt v. DeDakis, 254 N.W.2d 171 (Wis. 1977). 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. at 186. 
 131. Id. 
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never intended to be repaid in full.132  Third, the amount of 
initial capitalization must be nominal or unreasonably small 
in view of the nature and size of the corporation for 
recharacterization to occur.133  Using these three factors, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the corporation was 
sufficiently capitalized from its birth.134  Accordingly, the debt 
was not recharacterized.135 
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO DEBT 
RECHARACTERIZATION IS UNWORKABLE IN BOTH 
THEORY AND APPLICATION 
The varying rationales of the federal circuits and state 
courts are poorly conceived from one another and virtually 
impossible to reconcile. 
From an academic perspective, the wide body of 
inconsistent debt recharacterization decisions has made it 
utterly impossible to determine if debt recharacterization 
should be a power granted to state or federal courts.136  
Additionally, whether debt recharacterization should 
independently exist at all warrants discussion.  Further, the 
lines between what triggers equitable subordination and debt 
recharacterization are poorly defined.  Some courts seem to use 
each remedy interchangeably, whereas others treat each as a 
distinct tool with different ends and means.137  The 
inconsistent application of debt recharacterization combined 
with a multitude of approaches to the issue also fosters an 
impetus to forum shop, contradicting the uniformity 
envisioned by the Constitution.138 
Practically speaking, this doctrinal instability has created 
a hostile environment for business decisions.  Creditors are 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Gelatt v. DeDakis, 254 N.W.2d 171, 186 (Wis. 1977). 
 134. Id. at 189. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Courts have applied four different standards for recharacterization in 
federal courts alone.  See Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N&D Props., Inc.), 799 
F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1986); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re SubMicron 
Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors for Dornier Aviation of North America, Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 
2006); Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial 
Funding Corp., Inc. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1986). 
 137. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934). 
 138. See supra  Part I(A)(4). 
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unwilling to extend potentially lifesaving loans for fear they 
will be unable to recoup any of their expenses.139  Venture 
capital funds will be less likely to supply loans without 
attaching exorbitant conditions in order to assure security of 
their capital.140  Acquisitions will be halted, while attorneys 
choose to wash a company through bankruptcy before risking 
the assumption of any questionable creditors, imposing 
needless strain on an already overwhelmed judiciary. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Should Debt Recharacterization Exist At All? 
The first question is whether or not debt 
recharacterization even needs to continue existing as a 
doctrine independent from equitable subordination.  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion in Albert Richards, for 
example, used debt recharacterization as a remedy under state 
law.141  This very same case was cited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Pepper v. Litton, a case that established federal power 
to equitably subordinate claims.142  Although the two courts 
used different phraseology, they accomplished identical results 
using near identical factors for analysis.143  Despite the 
confusion that inherently arises in reading both these cases, a 
close look at the true purpose behind each doctrine clearly 
indicates that equitable subordination and debt 
recharacterization provide independent remedies and can 
coexist with one another to provide important contributions.  
Firstly, as mentioned prior,144 equitable subordination is a 
doctrine that permits courts to void or subordinate the claims 
of creditors upon a finding of inequitable conduct or a 
combination of various other similar factors.145  There is no 
question that a loan had been extended, but the court considers 
whether that loan should stand in light of other intervening 
factors.  Debt recharacterization, on the other hand, asks 
 
 139. See James H.M. Sprayregen, Recharacterization from Debt to Equity: 
Lenders Beware, 22-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2003). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, 191 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1934). 
 142. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
 143. See id. at 311–12; Albert Richards Co., 191 N.E. at 434–35. 
 144. See supra Part I(B)(1). 
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000). 
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whether a bona fide loan was even made in the first place.146  If 
there were no loan ever transacted, then debt 
recharacterization would classify that capital contribution as 
equity.147  Of course, creditor conduct may still factor into the 
analysis, since such conduct can impact whether a loan is 
formed (such as if improper procedures are followed).148  While 
the ends may be the same, the means to reach those ends differ 
greatly between equitable subordination and debt 
recharacterization.149  As a result, both may serve valid legal 
purposes while avoiding conflict with one another.  Equitable 
subordination serves to punish creditors that act inequitably, 
while debt recharacterization corrects “sham” loans by 
properly reclassifying as equity contributions.150 
B. Confusion and uncertainty among courts 
Assuming, consistent with the above analysis, that debt 
recharacterization should exist as an independent doctrine 
from equitable subordination, the matter of courts’ differing 
formulations of the doctrine still must be addressed.  At 
present, the Eleventh Circuit maintains an independent 
analysis of the doctrine that differs from that of the Ninth 
Circuit.151  Each of those Circuits are in disagreement with the 
Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, who have all agreed 
on a common list of factors to be applied.152  State courts have 
also lent their voice to the issue by formulating independent 
multi-factor tests in addition to those already established on 
the federal level.  Massachusetts, for example, has established 
two key factors in its decisions.153  Wisconsin, on the other 
hand, administers debt recharacterization using a state 
standard that diverges from both Massachusetts and the 
federal tests.154  The obvious consequence of this wide disparity 
in recharacterization standards is that creditors face different 
results depending on the state in which the corporation enters 
 
 146. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity 
Recharacterization Is It More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin?, 22-
NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2004). 
 147. See, e.g., Diasonics Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See supra Part I(B)(2). 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
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bankruptcy.  With so many differing standards of debt 
recharacterization, the development of any form of coherent 
case law on the matter is stunted, weakening the legal 
significance of what could otherwise be an important tool for 
bankruptcy lawyers and judges. 
C. The Present Debt Recharacterization Approach is 
Inconsistent with Fundamental Bankruptcy Court 
Principles 
The current status of debt recharacterization also 
contravenes a key principle of bankruptcy court function.  
While these courts have traditionally been viewed as courts of 
equity,155 the ability to freely formulate equitable remedies is 
illusory.156  For example, power to equitably subordinate debt 
is sourced from a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code, not 
any inherent equitable power of the court.157  While such 
equitable powers were present nearly a century ago,158 the 
modern development of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that a 
statutory basis is necessary for the exercise of such legal 
authority.159  Without a statutory basis for action, bankruptcy 
courts are prevented from formulating remedies or developing 
federal common law,160 save several narrow exceptions.  Debt 
recharacterization does not fit within these narrowly drawn 
instances.161  Of course, this issue has up until the present been 
ignored by federal cases that choose to recharacterize debt.162  
Nonetheless, specific codification of debt recharacterization 
would reinforce fundamental bankruptcy principles while 
solving the litany of other complications addressed in this 
analysis. 
D. The Current Approach Contravenes the Uniformity 
 
 155. See supra note 38. 
 156. See also, Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of A 
Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not A Court of Equity, 79 
AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 2 (2005). 
 157. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000). 
 158. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
 159. See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE 282 (4th ed. 1918). 
 160. See supra note 37; Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 B.R. 162 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The Ninth Circuit is alone in refusing to recognize a federal ability to 
recharacterize debt. See Unsecured Creditors’ Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). 
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Clause 
The final important conflict the current debt 
recharacterization analysis is incompatibility with the 
uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution.163  That clause, which mandates that the rules 
applied by all bankruptcy courts be uniform,164 stands in clear 
contrast with the current structure of debt recharacterization 
law. 
Firstly, individual federal circuits have established 
differing views on the doctrine.165  Not only do these analyses 
use distinct factors, but some courts flat out refuse to recognize 
the validity of debt recharacterization.166  Such disparate 
treatment is inconsistent with a fundamental purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which seeks to provide identical standards 
for every bankruptcy court in the nation to the extent 
possible.167  Insolvency law and bankruptcy are not areas of law 
in which federal common law development has been applied.168  
There is simply no basis for the differential treatment of debt 
recharacterization on a federal level among the circuits where 
the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide as close to uniform 
results as possible.169 
State law debt recharacterization processes170 also 
contravene the uniformity envisioned by the Constitution.  
While state standards may not literally contradict existing 
case law, it is axiomatic that a federal standard would 
establish a more uniform standard among bankruptcy courts 
than application of potentially fifty different state standards. 
 
 163. See supra Part I(A)(4). 
 164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 165. The following cases, each in federal bankruptcy court, applied different 
standards from one another.  See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II LP (In re 
SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 455 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier 
GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 
233 (4th Cir. 2006); In re Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding 
Corp., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). 
 166. See In re Pacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp., 69 
B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). 
 167. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code itself stems in part from the 
Constitutional mandate of bankruptcy uniformity.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 
(empowering Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States”). 
 168. See supra Part I(A)(2). 
 169. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 105. 
 170. See supra Part I(A)(5). 
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Just because this degree of uniformity is not legally required 
does not mean that it should be abandoned as unachievable.  
Codification of debt recharacterization is a step in this exact 
direction, and would help put bankruptcy courts on track in 
the direction the Constitution envisioned. 
E. Practical Impact on Corporate Law 
The existing instability in the application of debt 
recharacterization has an effect on the business environment 
and corporate bankruptcy attorneys. 
Lender hesitancy is especially concerning in business 
environments like the Silicon Valley, where emerging 
enterprises constantly shift between terms of profitability and 
loss.  Special “bridge loans” are often utilized to provide short-
term cash infusions to these companies to keep them on their 
feet in periods of financial infancy.171  A debt 
recharacterization scheme that is impossible to navigate 
means venture funds will be less willing to extend these bridge 
loans, for fear that, should the enterprise go bankrupt, those 
loans will be recharacterized and rendered virtually 
unrecoverable.  With recharacterization codified and 
accompanied by clear standards, investors are provided with 
the increased predictability necessary to secure their loans 
with other tools.172  These lenders would be able to see from the 
outset the probability of recharacterization arising, and have 
the ability to compensate accordingly with other legal devices 
to secure the integrity of their investments. 
The corporate acquisitions market may also abate from 
the uncertainty caused by inconsistent debt recharacterization 
standards on both state and federal levels.  While this does not 
necessarily place the financial health of the acquiror at 
immediate risk, it nonetheless presents a level of uncertainty 
that can endanger relationships of the acquiror with the 
target’s creditors.173  A better strategy for the acquirer is 
perhaps simply to let the target corporation enter into 
bankruptcy and have the courts interpret the loans.  Following 
bankruptcy, the acquirer can emerge and assume control free 
 
 171. See David J. Kendall, Venture Capital Lending: Usury and Fiduciary 
Duty Concerns, 33-APR COLO. LAW (2004). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Yedidia Z. Stern, A General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26 
J. CORP. L. 675, 711–15 (2001). 
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of potential infirmities of the target corporation’s debt.174 
F. Judicial Expense 
Judicial resources are continuously wasted in dealing with 
the current debt recharacterization regime.  In the example 
provided in the preceding paragraph, using the court system 
as an arbiter for corporate decisions is a clear waste of 
resources.  Corporate attorneys will use the taxpayer as a tool 
for private acquisitions due to the uncertainty resulting from 
inconsistent recharacterization standards.  Companies that 
could be saved from bankruptcy and kept out of the courts may 
be intentionally allowed to default so potential investors may 
start with a clean slate and greater certainty regarding their 
position with creditors. 
Furthermore, the sheer number of differing standards 
imposes unnecessary adjudicative complexity.  Courts 
approaching a recharacterization analysis will be burdened 
with having to balance federal versus state law on an issue.  
Once that choice is made, the question remains regarding what 
factors from each standard are relevant and should apply.  
Recharacterization is a manner of interpreting loans in the 
course of a bankruptcy, and need not be an area of law devoted 
to complex choice of law analysis. 
G. Recharacterization under State Law is Inadequate 
A position among those who have considered the proper 
remedy for the current debt recharacterization is that 
recharacterization should exist only under state law.175  The 
basis for this proposal is stated in Travelers Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.176 There, the Court articulated 
that it is a “settled principle [that] [c]reditors’ entitlements in 
bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying 
substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation, subject to any 
qualifying or contrary provision of the Bankruptcy Code.”177  
That case in question involved the Fobian rule.178  The rule 
 
 174. See, e.g., David A. Warfield, Bankruptcy Bazaar: Purchasing Assets Out 
of Bankruptcy Court, 51 J. MO. B. 283, 284–86 (1995). 
 175. See James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization 
Under State Law, 62 BUS. LAW. 1257 (2007). 
 176. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
127 S. Ct. 1199, 1204–05 (2007). 
 177. Id. (quoting Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)). 
 178. Id. at 1203. 
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asserted that where the litigated issue involves bankruptcy 
issues, not basic contract issues, attorneys’ fees cannot be 
collected absent a showing of certain circumstances.179 That 
common law rule was developed through bankruptcy court 
decisions rather than the exercise of a particular statutory 
provision.180  The Court reasoned that since there was no 
statutory support for the Fobian rule in Bankruptcy Code 
Section 502(b)181 (which is where the Code governs 
disallowance of claims), the rule could not stand.182  Thus, state 
law was applied and Fobian rule struck down.183 
Proponents of a state-based recharacterization standard 
also rely on a second case, Raleigh v. Illinois Department of 
Revenue.184  In that case, the Supreme Court considered 
whether claims in bankruptcy should be considered based on 
federal rules or a state specific standard.185  The federal rules, 
while uniform, were not codified into the Bankruptcy Code.186  
The Court again focused on the uneven results from applying 
a mix of federal or state law.187  Specifically, the Court noted 
that it could not have been Congress’s intent that state and 
federal courts produce rules that could lead to such conflicting 
results.188  Critical in the Court’s reasoning in both Raleigh and 
Traveler’s Casualty Insurance is the rule that in the absence of 
a modification to the Bankruptcy Code, claims are determined 
through state law.189  This sentiment has been echoed in other 
rulings as well.190 
The above reasoning forms the backbone of the argument 
for debt recharacterization under a state standard.  The 
proponents indicate the explicit standard for equitable 
subordination in the Bankruptcy Code as noted by the Court 
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 180. Id. at 1207. 
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 190. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57, 54 (1979)); see also Vanston 
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946) (“What claims 
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in its decisions on the matter.191  This is considered proof that 
the equitable powers of the court must still be grounded within 
the Code in order to be effectuated.192  Thus, recharacterization 
as an “equitable” remedy produced by a federal court simply is 
not sufficient.  Proponents of a state law standard argue that 
debt recharacterization is a form of contract interpretation and 
should be governed by state law in the absence of federal 
standards.193  Currently of course, the Bankruptcy Code does 
not address recharacterization.194  Thus, absent any 
Congressional action to the contrary, Supreme Court 
precedent seems to dictate that debt recharacterization fall 
under state law.195 
State law proponents also argue that in addition to being 
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, state law debt 
recharacterization provides the doctrinal stability so keenly 
needed.196  These proponents also indicate, as this comment 
does, that this stability will brighten the business climate for 
creditors, business insiders, and even third party investors.197  
In support of this proposition, the laws of Wisconsin and 
Massachusetts are put forth as examples of functioning state 
recharacterization standards.198 
In citing each of these state standards for support, 
however, advocates for the state standard reveal the precise 
reason such a standard fails to help the recharacterization 
doctrine rescue itself from the current confusion.199  State 
courts will develop potentially fifty different methods of 
recharacterizing debt.  Creditors will be subject to fifty 
different outcomes, and forum shopping will increase as these 
creditors seek favorable state law (for example through the use 
of forum selection clauses in loan instruments).200  While this 
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result still would seem to fit within the “uniformity” as 
technically permitted by the Court,201 it certainly contravenes 
the uniformity envisioned by Article I and the creation of 
federal bankruptcy courts intended to provide a uniform 
nationwide bankruptcy system.202 
Finally, state law proponents criticize existing federal 
court decisions applying federal standards for debt 
recharacterization.203  Specifically, the Roth Steel factors204 are 
targeted as being too vague to provide any degree of useful 
predictability.205  These factors however, must necessarily 
possess some degree of inchoateness so bankruptcy courts have 
the ability to fashion case-specific remedies in the discharge of 
their “equitable” duties.206  While the court’s equitable power 
is granted in the modern era by statute, bankruptcy courts are 
expected to weigh the merits of each individual case they 
adjudicate.207  Assuming that a bankruptcy court can indeed 
recharacterize debt, the Roth Steel factors are capable tools for 
giving a court the space to fashion appropriate case specific 
remedies while still providing the necessary foresight for 
attorneys to fashion effective loan agreements. 
IV. TOWARDS CODIFICATION OF DEBT 
RECHARACTERIZATION IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Debt recharacterization deserves to exist as an 
independent doctrine from equitable subordination.  As stated 
previously, equitable subordination is a remedy in which a 
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creditor loan is subordinated based on some inequitable 
conduct by the creditor.208  Debt recharacterization, which 
looks to whether a loan was even made in the first place,209 
provides a unique and important tool for analysis that should 
be utilized by bankruptcy courts.  Simply choosing to not 
recognize the doctrine of recharacterization is as equally 
unacceptable as the present doctrinal chaos. 
Thus, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
include debt recharacterization as an express provision within.  
A clear, universal standard is needed to sufficiently address 
the inconsistency currently plaguing the doctrine.  For the 
reasons mentioned above, a state law standard is 
insufficient.210  Further, the matter cannot be simply left to the 
courts to develop through case law, as bankruptcy courts are 
limited to only a few explicitly enumerated areas in which to 
develop federal common law.211 
A distinct section of the Code setting forth the 
circumstances for use and factors to be applied in a 
recharacterization analysis facilitates the greatest degree of 
legal clarity and practical utility.  Such a section should look 
very much like the existing Code section that sets forth the 
power of a court to equitably subordinate loans.212  More 
specifically, codification of the Roth Steel factors213 into the 
section is appropriate, which the majority of federal circuits 
already apply.214  This enumeration of specific factors is of 
paramount importance.  Creditors can structure their 
financings appropriately, having a greater degree of foresight 
as to the potential risk of their debt interests should 
bankruptcy result.  The fact that no single factor controls the 
analysis, however, also preserves the flexibility of the courts to 
provide individualized remedies in each proceeding. 
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The most readily apparent benefit to the codification of 
debt recharacterization is the resulting doctrinal clarity.  
Specific factors enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code mean 
courts can look to a single source of law with explicit means for 
analysis.  Since the Bankruptcy Code is federal law, it would 
preempt state law when exercised by the bankruptcy court 
undertaking the recharacterization analysis.215  Ideally, 
preemptive intent should also be explicitly stated in the statute 
or legislative history of the codified version of 
recharacterization for maximal clarity.  The federal standard’s 
uniformity, while not strictly required by current 
constitutional jurisprudence,216 is nonetheless a benefit to 
incorporating debt recharacterization into the Code.  Under 
the proposed approach, creditors would have no incentive to 
forum shop among courts with differing outlooks towards 
recharacterization. 
Perhaps the only drawback to the creation of a federal 
standard is a federalism-based argument that addition of debt 
recharacterization to the Code takes away what should be a 
domain for state law, which of course normally governs the 
relationships between debtor and creditor.  Debt 
recharacterization, a tool of loan interpretation, could thus be 
said to properly reside in state law as a tool purposed for 
defining creditor relationships. However, recharacterization is 
a remedy most commonly sought where entities enter into 
bankruptcy.217  Its inclusion in the Bankruptcy Code, a body of 
law used exclusively by federal courts,218 is equally 
appropriate.  Federal law, which provides the power to 
adjudicate bankruptcies through Article I of the 
Constitution,219 is the proper place for a bankruptcy-centric 
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doctrine like debt recharacterization.  Nonetheless, should 
individual states desire to enact debt recharacterization-like 
provisions for use outside of the bankruptcy context, there is 
nothing stopping them from doing so.  Recharacterization’s use 
in the bankruptcy context, however, should be reserved for 
bankruptcy courts under the Code. 
CONCLUSION 
The current approach to debt recharacterization is 
confusing in theory and unworkable in application.  Simply 
eliminating the doctrine of debt recharacterization, however, 
is an abrogation of a valuable judicial tool, one that serves an 
important purpose independent from equitable subordination. 
While some have called for recharacterization to 
incorporate as a select state law element of bankruptcy law, 
that proposal solves but a fraction of the issues plaguing the 
current system.  Rather, a congressional mandate to 
incorporate recharacterization as a section of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides the best solution to establish both a uniform and 
useful debt recharacterization system. 
Codification brings theoretical clarity and practical utility 
to the legal community.  Corporate attorneys will enjoy the 
certainty of a uniform federal standard applying enumerated 
factors.  Business transactions can be more confidently 
pursued, with everything from acquisitions to bridge loans 
being expedited because of this transparent standard.  Finally, 
bankruptcy courts are spared the murky wade through 
multiple independent recharacterization approaches.  A single 
body of federal recharacterization law can be developed, 
promoting judicial precision and efficiency. 
 
